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Abstract
This paper is a case study based on forest sector development during the first ten years
of economic transition in Estonia between 1991–2000. The study attempts to shed light
on the significance of social norms, beliefs and conventions for the implementation of
Government policies. The format of the analysis relies on the description of consecutive
steps in the evolution of the country’s forest sector, allowing speculations and
conclusions on why some policy actions are more successful than others. Using
Douglass C. North’s ideas on the factors that most influence economic progress, the
author follows the interplay between the formal and informal institutions during the
above-mentioned era in Estonian forestry. The author finds that the so strongly
advocated participatory policy making procedures alone do not necessarily guarantee
the achievement of socially acceptable policy outcomes. Individual decision-makers’
actions may alter the course of policy-making and contribute significantly to
uncertainties related to successful policy implementation.
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1The Estonian Forest Sector in Transition:
Institutions at Work
Aigar Kallas
1. Introduction
The “countries-in-transition” of Central and Eastern Europe have undergone
tremendous political and economic change over the past decade. From the onset, it has
been clear that there was no universally applicable blueprint for the transition from a
centrally planned to a fully functional, market-driven economy (Trudeau, 1991). Not
surprisingly, the process has proved difficult everywhere and it is not complete
anywhere (Kolodko, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999a). The comparative analyses have, however,
resulted in the identification of both “winners” and “losers” of transition (Ellman,
1997).
This uneven development provides scientists and policy makers with an opportunity to
examine the causes of successes and failures in economic transition. Three sets of
possible explanations have been proposed to understand the differences in this process:
(i) initial conditions; (ii) choice of macroeconomic policies; and (iii) performance of
institutions.
Stern (1998), Chief Economist for the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development, lists a variety of initial conditions — per capita income level, degree of
environmental degradation, energy use efficiency, etc., to shed light on the progress of
transition. He also states that “those countries that moved ahead most quickly and firmly
with the implementation of reforms have generally seen the most rapid economic
recovery” (Stern, 1998, p. 4). Stiglitz (1999a), former Chief Economist for the World
Bank, is much more pessimistic in terms of how much economic progress has actually
been achieved. He argues that all countries in Central and Eastern Europe are, in fact,
confronted with a transition failure. The primary cause for this is the misunderstanding
of the institutional reform process (Stiglitz, 1999a).
More thorough research on institutional development has allowed Hira and Hira (2000)
assert that differences in institutions are the primary causes for differences in economic
outcomes: “[b]y implication, some institutions in some countries are more efficient in
reaching social outcomes, which explains, ceteris paribus, why some countries enjoy
higher standards of living than others” (Hira and Hira, 2000, p. 270). Hudson (1999)
argues that successful economic development models are embedded in specific regional
and national cultures and social structures showing, at least in part, how institutions
affect economic prosperity.
2Nobel prize winner Douglass C. North defines social structures as “a complex mixture
of rules, norms, conventions and behavioral beliefs, all of which together form the way
in which we operate and determine how successful we are in achieving our goals”
(North, 2000, p. 7). Earlier, North (1997) also stressed the importance of time, policies
and, what he calls the “scaffolds,”1 to the improvement of transition economies’
performance (Figure 1). In this framework Policies are meant to direct people’s
perceptions and expectations to common targeted action and will produce the desired
results only if the informal norms are complementary to rule changes. It can be argued
that formal rules are just a reflection of social norms, the execution of which shapes the
evolution of rules. In this process the social norms themselves are altered, creating a
dynamic, mutually interdependent and continuously changing social structure.
Figure 1: Time, Policies, and Scaffolds.
Separately grouping formal (political and judicial rules, economic rules, contracts) and
informal (social norms, conventions, and internally held beliefs) institutions, the
implementation of policies from “above” and the reaction to those from “below”
determine whether an economy will progress or stagnate. Time extends along the
horizontal axis and, together with the number of policy exchanges, tells us how capable
are the institutions of achieving desirable outcomes. More actions reduce efficiency and
therefore translates to less success. Counting the actions and investigating their origins
allows us to understand why some policies bring about quicker progress than others.
The critical question is, what exactly are the informal institutions that decide on the
direction of society’s policy actions, and knowing those, can they be targeted in a
manner that guarantees the achievement of policy objectives?
Stiglitz (1999b, p. 33) wrote that “an institutional infrastructure — including not just
contract enforcement, but also competition policy, bankruptcy law, and financial
institutions and regulations” are the prerequisites of a market economy. He claims that a
lack of formal institutions, such as banks and other potentially interested parties capable
of monitoring reforms, artificial competition and ambiguous rules of privatization, have
caused the failure of transformation in most transition economies. After several years of
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3extensive research on the institutional development in Russian forestry, IIASA
concludes that, indeed, on the constitutional level this claim holds water (Nilsson, 1999;
Carlsson, et al., 2000). However, using Kiser and Ostrom’s (1982) categorization of
institutions, Carlsson et al. (2000, p. 25) argue that on the collective and operational
choice levels, other explanations have to be found for Russia’s poor economic
performance. IIASA’s work with the individual entrepreneurs, policy makers, local
government officials, etc., in Russia has revealed that the undefined mutual relations
between the market players and a shortage of respective institutions are prevailing in the
country’s present day forestry. The natural outcome of the described situation is
“widespread and deeply rooted lack of trust” that characterizes relations between
business partners in Russia. Lehmbruch (2000) reaches a similar conclusion when
describing the widespread web of informal organizational ties that the actors of the
Russian forest sector have established as a part of their survival strategy.
2. Case Study
This paper considers the evolution of forestry organizations in one republic of the
former Soviet Union — Estonia — to investigate the transition progress. The forest
sector’s development throughout the transformation period from the year 1990 to 2000
involved two major phases: (i) the establishment of a private sector, and (ii) an attempt
to introduce stakeholder-based participatory policy making practices.
The first part of this paper ties the first five years of transition in the forest sector to
Estonia’s general political and economic framework. It was observed that the regained
independence and reorientation to the private sector gave rise to individualistic behavior
within society, substantially affecting relations between the emerging social groups. It
will be argued that the separation of the State and enterprises played a crucial role in
determining the fate of the country’s forest sector. It will be claimed that the emergence
of a private sector coincident with a weakening of public governance provided the
foundation for an exceptionally rapid progress of the Estonian forest industry during the
1990s. Two examples of social restructuring, the decentralization of power in the State
forestry administration and the not yet completed re-establishment of private forestland
ownership, provide evidence to the importance of organized action in public policy
making.2
Trust-building and social learning form the core of the second part of the paper, which
considers the process of participatory policy formulation and implementation that
characterized the Estonian forestry sector during the second half of the 1990s. The
connecting link between policies and policy-making in this period will be investigated
through separate examinations of the personal and organizational performance of the
principal actors in this process. Using information obtained from personal interviews
with the stakeholder representatives, it will be shown that the choice of a policy
formulation tool alone did not guarantee successful policy implementation. It was
observed that the manner in which policy making was conducted turned out to be
crucial for achieving desirable outcomes. It was found that in the policy formulation
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implementation, and a monitoring phase.
4process stakeholders reacted quickly and adjusted their behavior to that of other groups.
It will be argued that interaction between the social groups during the policy making
process had an enormous impact on the evolution of social norms and, consequently, on
the fate of Estonian forest policy.
3. First Policy Action — Privatization
Åslund (1997, p. 454), referring to Kornai (1992), defines the ultimate aim of post-
communist transition as the building of capitalism — de-politicization of the economy,
activation of markets, and the institution of private ownership of the means of
production. The public sector constituted up to 90 percent of the East European national
economies by the end of the socialist era (Purju, 1996). The overall shift from the public
to the private sector became the focus of economic restructuring, necessitating a policy
to transfer State property to private ownership. A large number of privatization schemes
were proposed or attempted in different countries, varying in their speed, degree of
restructuring, etc. Stern (1998) claimed that these schemes profoundly influenced the
future economic prosperity in the region. It is important to notice that, in addition to the
economic significance of privatization, the change of ownership pattern became a
means for the redistribution of power and the establishment of new political focal points
(Major, 1993).
3.1 Remnants of the Soviet Era
Like any other sector in the Soviet Union’s economy, the forest sector was regulated by
a single decree across the entire country. In principle, each Soviet Republic had its own
forest code but there were no significant differences between the Union and Republic
level documents (Etverk, 1998). The Soviet Estonian forest code, being replaced by the
new Forestry Act (1993) no earlier than November 1993, was very general however,
and all forest management operations were actually regulated by numerous individual
directives. The latter were either prepared or approved by the central public forestry
authority in Moscow.
In addition to the detailed forest management directives, Soviet-style forestry was also
administratively very complex (Figure 2). The pre-war Estonian Forest Service was
taken over and maintained intact until the very beginning of the country’s re-
establishment. Private forests, which constituted a relatively small share of the country’s
total forest area in 1940, were thereafter left to be taken care of by the agricultural
sector (by the state and collective farms). Under this arrangement, 50 years of declining
agricultural production led to an increase in the area of farm forests until farms
accounted for half of the country’s total forest territory.
Oversight of the principal forest management and wood processing operations in Soviet
Estonia was split between two government ministries: one responsible for the industry
and energy sector, and the other for nature conservation and resource management. The
former ministry had seven large-scale forest enterprises (metsakombinaat) under its
supervision. These enterprises were in charge of final felling and also conducted
primary wood processing operations.
5Figure 2: Structure of the Estonian Public Forestry Administration Prior to and After the Reforms.
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6The latter ministry’s supervisory tasks were more complex. Since 1947, the initial
structure of the public forest management organization consisted of a central
administration: the State Forestry Department, 23 regional offices (metsamajand), and
213 local forest districts (metskond).
One of the characteristics of the Soviet planning system was its extraordinarily high
degree of centralization. For example, orders regarding final felling were issued directly
from Moscow, on the reasoning that the output was part of the Union-wide harvesting
plan. A related feature of the Soviet era planning mechanism was the requirement to
increase harvests in each management period. The massive storm damage in Estonia in
the 1960s, which brought significant additional wood supply to the market, provided a
rationale for Moscow to set even higher output goals for the 1970s. The strong focus on
harvesting output was later identified as a primary reason for the poor quality of forest
management in Estonia during the Soviet era (CTS Consulting, 1992).
3.2 Changes in the Forestry Administration
The Estonian forestry sector was under heavy pressure by the end of the 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s. Many influential political players, such as the Government
authorities in charge of resources and manufacturing, political figures close to the
Cabinet, etc., advocated quota-based distribution as the primary means of allocating
timber to wood processors. The unstable economic conditions and the fall of the ruble
in particular made the State Forestry Department extremely skeptical of such
suggestions. Resisting the outside influence, the Department headquarters, supported
strongly by the regional managers, established open bidding as the sole method of
selling timber from the State forests (Klaos, 2000).
The 1990 Estonian Government saw forestry as a significant source of income for the
Treasury. A Government decree was prepared to unite the seven wood manufacturing
enterprises (which were already organized into a single organization, Eesti
Territoriaalne Tootmiskoondis “Eesti Metsatööstus”) with the regional forestry offices
of the State Forestry Department. Subsidies were anticipated to be allocated to the
organization in order to ensure a quick re-establishment of the sector’s export potential.
The forest districts were to be separated from commercial forestry operations and
funded directly from the Government’s budget.
This decree was never passed, but it nevertheless played an extraordinarily significant
role in the future development of Estonian forestry. The first months after the decree
was proposed served as a period of trust-building among district forest managers. The
period culminated when the newly established district managers’ association (Eesti
Metsaülemate Ühing)3 entered the debate on the future of the country’s forestry. Owing
to the political connections of its nearly 200 members, the organization became an
influential player in the Government’s corridor lobby. Under pressure from the district
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 The association of district forest managers (Eesti Metsaülemate Ühing) was, similar to many other
organizations at the time, actually re-established. A similar association already existed during the
country’s first independence period 1920–1940.
7foresters, a separate Inter-Ministerial Committee was formed to find an alternative
solution to the further development of the country’s forest sector.
Since the Eesti Metsaülemate Ühing argued that the country’s public forestry had
become too focused on timber output, the Committee made a recommendation to
organizationally separate forest management from the wood processing operations. In
this way, the Government’s earlier plans were largely reconfirmed, the only difference
being that the forest districts were promised exclusive rights over the forest
management in their respective territories. This solution was acceptable to all parties,
the actual implementation, however, led to quite different results.
Restructuring of the public forestry organizations was finally undertaken at the end of
1991 and the beginning of 1992. As has often been observed during the first years of
such a transition, the top management of the forestry administration saw a business
opportunity rising in the planned change. By that time, the first private timber
companies had already been established and the State-owned wood export organization,
ESTIMPEX, had started fading away. The people involved in it had captured the
existing contracts and connections and transferred them to the private sector. In order to
maintain access to the foreign markets, the State Forestry Department decided to unite
the regional forest management offices into a single public company, the “Estonian
State Forests” (Eesti Riigimetsad). This would have created not just a marketing, but
also a strong forest management enterprise, as the new organization absorbed all the
forestry equipment in public possession. The Chair of the Department decided to step
into the promising money boat and become the head of the new enterprise. The
“robbery” of the forestry equipment that then occurred, pushed the forest district
managers to a revolt. To maintain peace inside the public forestry, the minister
ultimately established the forest districts as separate administrational units. The
Department was appointed a new Chair, and the forest districts were subordinated
directly to him. An important piece of information here is that the new Chair was
chosen from among the district managers themselves. Believing that an organizational
structure of this kind would have no chance for effective performance, the rest of the
Department’s core management left office to join the private sector.
The “Estonian State Forests” never succeeded as an independent venture. Even though a
central marketing administration was established and some joint capital was
accumulated, the Soviet-era logging and processing capacities were never going to be
competitive on the open market. A year later, the organization was transferred to the
ministry in charge of industry and energy and was, piece by piece, privatized along the
seven State forestry enterprises originally supervised by the ministry. Since the form of
privatization was always open tendering with a preference for investors making
commitments for additional strategic investments, no question was raised if the
enterprises were acquired by local or foreign capital. Currently, due to obsolete
technology and poor management, many are bankrupt. Approximately half, mostly
owned by foreign investors, have been reconstructed and are still in business.
The forest districts emerged from this process with a considerable degree of
independence. Even though the district managers had lost the battle to become the sole
manager of the State forests, they were only obliged to sell the stands for final felling
via public auctions, retaining control over the disposal of thinning and half of the
auction revenues. The reorganized State Forestry Department with only 20 employees,
8was ill equipped to serve as a watchdog over the activities of the nearly 200 districts.
The situation resulted in decentralization of power in public forestry, inevitably
weakening the Government’s ability to take any initiative in the sector’s development.
The forest industries, on the other hand, were in a very different situation. The overall
government policy favored a complete privatization of State owned enterprises and
strongly supported foreign capital inflow. Moreover, the introduced economic shock
therapy cut all the subsidies to industrial production. The split between the State and the
enterprises tore apart the network relations that had been established between the mix of
Government offices during the Soviet era, leaving private industries not only without
direct public support, but also without access to the raw material.
3.3 Re-establishment of the Private Forestland Ownership
The Soviet Estonian farming sector was primarily comprised by the state and collective
farms (sovkhoses and kolkhoses). Individual families had been granted small plots of
public land for household use. These plots helped people to sustain their livelihoods and
likely contributed to the pressure to re-establish private farm based agricultural
production in the country soon after independence was again declared.
The Farmstead Act of 1989 (Farmstead Act, 1989) served as a trigger in this process.
The first private farmers were given land simply upon request. This method did not take
into consideration any historical property boundaries, nor were the new owners
necessarily related to the people who used to own these lands prior to nationalization
which took place after World War II. The subsequent Law of Land Reform (1991),
endorsed by the newly elected (1990) Parliament in 1991, determined the land
restitution in the first order to the pre-war owners. Compensating the former owners the
land value in the case of restitution was not practical, but avoided a series of potential
complications. As opposed to several other countries in the region (e.g., Russia), the
establishment of private forestland ownership was never submitted to any legal
restrictions. Currently, the process is under way and is expected to end with a share of
52 percent private and 48 percent publicly owned forests (EFDP, 1997a).
The new Forestry Act of 1993 had a significant impact on the management of private
forests. Most importantly, the Act, acknowledging the existence of private forestland
ownership, determined the conditions for utilization of private forests. Forest
management plans were envisioned as the primary tools for guiding private owners’
activities.4 The owners were to be provided plans free of charge; the preparation of plans
was to be carried out by the State-run forest survey organization. At the same time, the
authorities also required prior endorsement of the forest management operations the
owners were planning to undertake. In 1998, it was reported that 300,000 hectares of
private forests (22,624 holdings) were covered by management plans (Yearbook, 1999).
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 In short, the plan was the result of an on-site forest survey, listing the stand inventory data and
describing the recommended forest management operations. The plan was mandatory in stipulating a
maximum ten-year cutting volume. In addition, a few other restrictions, such as the obligation to
regenerate and the application of forest protection measures, were made compulsory (Forestry Act, 1993).
9The fiercest political battle over the 1993 Forestry Act was fought between the public
forestry administration and the representatives of the private forest owners. The latter
group was strongly opposed to public control over private forest owners’ activities, and
was suggesting several measures for activating individual owners’ joint cooperation.
The organizations even went as far as attempting to influence the President to refuse the
declaration of the proposed Forestry Act (Etverk, 1998). The opinions that were later
expressed by the public forestry organization’s employees described this conflict more
as a power struggle between certain individuals than an ideological debate over private
forests per se (EMÜ Sõnumid, 1995). The private forest owners were also supported by
the Ministry of Agriculture, whose status was then endangered by the rapid decline in
the agricultural sector. Despite the combined efforts, the State Forestry Department was
determined to maintain oversight over private owners’ forestry operations.
3.4 Lessons from the First Wave of Change
Two distinct conclusions emerge from considering the first wave of restructuring in
Estonian forestry — the changes in the forest sector were very much in line with the
general economic policy, and only the policy actions that had significant support from
below were successfully implemented. The political power that the newly elected
Parliament had achieved as a result of promising to restitute/privatize the Soviet era
public sector was actually translated to concrete actions. The land reform undertaken
was the most time and resource consuming in all of Eastern Europe. At the same time, it
gave the Government the credibility it needed to execute more radical steps in other
sectors, like the introduction of barrier-free trade, the abolishment of State subsidies,
and the frequent privatization of industries to foreign strategic investors.
The events that transpired in the forest sector followed the same general pattern. Wood
processing output went into rapid decline right after the beginning of the 1990s. The
foreign markets were pushed wide open and, as the roundwood export skyrocketed, the
newly privatized wood industry immediately lost its access to cheap raw material. The
decision to introduce tender-based timber sale methods in public forestry was certainly
radical for the time. The initiative for this decision, however, came from inside the State
Forestry Department. Despite the change of leadership in 1992 and continuous external
pressure to abolish this rule, the auction principle stayed in place.
The effect of the complete replacement of leadership in the State Forestry Department
— the top management of the organization had stepped down from office — is still a
matter for speculation. The myth of endless opportunities that the private sector was
ready to offer, clearly had detrimental effects on the public sector’s performance. For
several years the graduates from forestry schools did not show any interest whatsoever
in public sector recruitment. Inevitably, momentum was lost in the development of
public forestry organizations. The uncontrollable decentralization and the establishment
of numerous independent management units within the State Forestry Department
probably caused significant efficiency losses in public forestry. As the local wood
market faced steep increases in timber prices, the public forestry organization lost
momentum, the consequences of which surfaced in 1996.
On the other hand, left without any State support, the private sector was able to come up
with a very effective strategy to cope with the situation. The European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition report claims that “as private sector
10
participation in the industry grew, companies developed connections on export markets
and accumulated capital, and timber traders looked into downstream investments to
provide greater value-added, high margin products” (EBRD, 1999). The basis for this
success can be found in the very early period of transition in the Estonian economy that
prevented the emergence of particularistic networks between the Government offices
and the business sector (for a contrasting example see Lehmbruch, 2000). The Estonian
timber industry became vertically disintegrated, the processors were separated from the
forest owners, and the former had to compete for raw material on an open market.
Hence, the pattern that can be observed in most other former Soviet Union republics —
the reliance on raw material exports with considerable Government involvement — did
not become the norm for Estonia. Indeed, new export links were established (and old
ones maintained), not by the Government, but by the local harvesting industry and
foreign entrepreneurs who expanded their wood processing operations.
The gradual strengthening of wood industries and the subsequent increase in timber
prices in the country also provided an incentive for the newly established private forest
owners to increase harvesting (Diagram 1). Theoretical calculations have indicated that
the annual net revenue (excluding capital costs) from private forests reached as much as
USD 38 per hectare in 1996 (EFDP, 1997a). Poor leadership and individualism,
however, resulted in weak performance of private forestland owners in the policy arena.
Even though the number of private forest owners has gradually increased, only 1
percent of them have joined in organizations. Lack of cooperation incentives seems to
be the main reason for the expressed low interest in joint activities. As these
organizations were not well established, their voice was not strong enough to
successfully defend their interests in the public decision making process. It has been
speculated that “the economic potential of forest owners’ organizations should come
into effect as soon as a sufficient legal framework and judicial capacity eliminates
incentives for illegal timber trade and consolidated timber sales from private forests
become attractive for timber merchants” (Tõnisson, 2000).
Diagram 1: Forest Harvesting Volume in Estonia by Ownership Category 1986–1999
(Source: EFDP, 1997a).
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4. Second Policy Action — Participatory Policy-Making
Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) claim that social trust and cosmopolitan leadership, that
recognizes and makes wise use of human limits, are the keys to a better society.
Objecting to McGarity’s (1986) suggestion that (lost) trust in public governance can be
(re-)created by involving full participation in agency decision making, they instead
advocate means such as division of labor and guided participation for public policy
making. Equal treatment of all participants is, according to Earle and Cvetkovich (1995,
p. 149–150), equivalent to saying “no one has anything of value to contribute” and
“public debate serves no useful function”.
The World Development Report from 1996 (World Bank, 1996) suggested that social
consensus would be crucial for success in economic transition. The international
forestry community is in general agreement, advocating participatory policy formulation
as the primary means for establishing the sector’s long-term development strategies.5
Efficiency and effectiveness, ethics, and ability to ensure adequate response to public
demand are frequently listed as the advantages of participation, as opposed to other
more conventional hierarchical methods (Warburton, 1997). Even though the nature of
forest management makes the use of such a decision-making tool in forestry particularly
costly, gains in later implementation are considered to by far outweigh the additional
time and administrative burden. One of the measures being, for instance, a reduced
number of post-decisional appeals (Daniels and Walker, 1997). In several countries,
such as the United States and Australia, participation has become a legal requirement in
public policy formulation. An analysis of Australia’s forest planning processes,
however, reveals that participation can lead to varying degrees of success (Buchy and
Hoverman, 2000).
4.1 Drivers for Change
Changes in the forest sector would probably have been inevitable even without the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Already in 1992, the first analyses of the post-Soviet
Estonian forest sector commented on the need to change. “The productivity of the
Estonian forestry is relatively low. For example, the average productivity of forest work
is two-thirds of the Finnish productivity” (CTS Consulting, 1992). The World Bank-led
Estonia Agriculture and Forestry Project reported that “although forest management
plans are generally based on reliable data and sound forest principles, forest
management declined during the 40 years of Soviet administration. The central planning
system was based upon targets for exploitation and silvicultural works were neglected.
The quality of stands deteriorated significantly” (World Bank, 1994).
The privatization of forest industries, the limitation of the State’s role, and the change of
leadership in the public forestry administration laid an excellent groundwork for rapid
development in the country’s forest sector. Indeed, with the help of free market policies,
Estonian timber quickly found its way to the export markets. In 1995, growth in the
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wood processing industry was recorded at approximately 15 percent, a year later the
annual growth rate came close to 30 percent (Diagram 2).
Diagram 2: Volume Index of the Industrial Production in Estonia at Constant Prices
(1991 = 100 percent) 1991–1998 (Sources: EFDP, 1997a; ESO, 2000).
Restructuring the remaining elements of the public forestry organization, however, has
not proceeded as smoothly as the privatization of the forest industries. The United
Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank missions to
Estonia in 1993 and 1994 identified a number of shortcomings in the country’s forest
sector, particularly in public forestry. The country was viewed as lacking a long-term
vision for forest sector development. Even though it was noted that the State Forestry
Department’s employees possessed all the necessary technical skills, the Department’s
staff were overwhelmed by the growing volume of day-to-day tasks, and unable to cope
with the urgent needs for administration improvement (Forestry Development Program
in Estonia, 1994).
Personal conversations with staff members in 1995–1996 revealed that the World Bank
missions had not even touched upon a more severe problem inside the public forestry
organization, namely, that the central forestry administration had little operational or
financial control over the management of State forests. Furthermore, there were
alarming signals from forest enterprises, concerning the waste of resources in some
forest districts, and of low-priced timber sales that raised the specter of corruption.
Dissatisfaction with the State Forestry Department’s activities grew as private forestland
ownership was gaining ground. According to the 1993 Forestry Act, the State Forestry
Department was required to endorse the forest management operations of private
owners. It became evident that since the authorities were understaffed, they frequently
failed to provide prompt service. Another important aspect here was the fact that State
and private owners were concurrently operating on the same timber market. This made
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the latter group suspicious about the intentions of the public forest officers when those
were performing their routine check-ups on private forests.
Finally, the State Forestry Department was unable to protect the forests that were in a
state of transition from public to private ownership. The occurrence of forest thefts
increased. Similarly, the forest management’s violations and noncompliance with
cutting regulations (Yearbook, 1999). As a result, non-governmental organizations
(NGO’s) began to pay closer attention to forestry issues. In 1995, the environmental
NGO’s, strengthened by earlier successes in Government lobby, started voicing their
concerns about the deficiencies in public forest management.
4.2 The Estonian Forestry Development Program
Under pressure from local industry, private forest owners, environmental NGO’s, and
the World Bank mission, the State Forestry Department was finally convinced to launch
an overhaul of the Estonian forest sector. The Finnish Government agreed to provide
necessary technical assistance for the endeavor. The two countries made a three-year
commitment under the condition that each would support the development project with
an annual budget of one million in their respective currencies.6 The opening meeting of
the Estonian Forestry Development Program (EFDP) was held in September 1995. Two
goals were set at the onset (EFDP, 1997b):
(i) to define general objectives for the development of the Estonian forest sector; and
(ii) to determine the actions that needed to be taken by the public sector in order to
reach these objectives.
It was decided that the Program should be a participatory undertaking, allowing for an
open dialogue among the stakeholders on all matters concerned. The pressing question
was how to ensure public participation in such a process. As the goal was not only to
come up with a national policy but also to introduce a different concept for public
decision making that could also be used in future development, a tradition of open
process had to be established. The Finnish participants emphasized that an effort had to
be made to avoid Government authorities’ dominance in the policy-making.
Several measures were taken to cope with the problems at hand. A three-step policy
formulation process was set up (Figure 3). First, thematic working groups were formed.
Membership in these groups was based purely on stakeholder interest. A national
steering committee was established where the major interest organizations were granted
equal representation. The committee was given the responsibility for drafting the policy
principles. The draft policies were then to be submitted to the Government and
subsequently to the Parliament for approval. Several research projects were launched to
provide scientific support for decision making. A Program Coordinators’ Office was
established to facilitate information exchange between the participants and to
communicate the draft policies to the general public.
                                               
6
 1 FIM = 2.63 EEK = 0.16 USD as of 23 June 2000 (Bank of Finland, 2000).
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Figure 3: Structure of the Estonian National Forest Policy Formulation Process.
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What became clear very quickly was that, aside from the public forestry administration,
no other stakeholder could guarantee representation for each thematic group (for
stakeholder motivation see Table 1). This immediately created suspicion among the
smaller interest groups, as they did not see how they would possibly be able to
effectively voice their opinion. In an interview just a few days after the inception
meeting, Mr. L. Polli, the Chairman of the Board for the Estonian Private Forest
Owners’ Association (EPFOA), stated: “a forest policy formulation process, which is
financed and organized by the State Forestry Department, does not adequately reflect all
forest owners’ views, and therefore it is currently not possible to reach solutions which
are acceptable to all parties. However, provided that arrangements are based on mutual
respect, the EPFOA is willing to participate in the discussion as the forest owners’
representative and as an expert in the subject matter” (EFDP Newsletter, 1995/1). 7
Other stakeholders were more willing to cooperate. Mr. M. Erik, the Chairman of the
Estonian Forest Industries’ Association (EFIA), answered the question whether or not
the industry would participate as follows: “EFIA considers it necessary to formulate a
comprehensive forest policy, and will actively participate in its preparation in relevant
areas. This ensures that the industries’ interests are taken into consideration, and that the
outcome of the policy process is useful and applicable” (EFDP Newsletter, 1995/1). The
Estonian Green Movement, represented by their Head of the Forestry Group, Mr. R.
Ahas, expressed his thoughts a month after the policy formulation process was launched
suggesting that: “the ongoing formulation of a Forest Policy, the way it is presently
conducted, provides all interest groups an opportunity for active participation. If they do
not utilize it, but opt to stay in opposition, it is clear that mutual distrust and accusations
will continue” (EFDP Newsletter, 1995/2).
Providing only very little guidance to the working groups on how to deal with matters at
hand, the scheduled gatherings immediately became an arena of free speech and hostile
accusations. Very few conclusions were reached and a limited number of suggestions
for future action were made. With one exception, none of the working groups produced
a comprehensive report of their work. As a result, the coordinators’ office decided to
use the minutes of the working group meetings and the results of scientific studies to
prepare a list of ends and means for each relevant subject area. Later, the working
groups were asked to comment upon these proposals; the coordinators then tied the
results together in one document. In order to avoid the interest groups dropping out of
the process, the resolution of conflicting issues was left at the steering committee’s
disposal.
                                               
7
 To receive more vocal opinion from the yet not fully established and underrepresented private forest
sector, the coordinators’ office organized a survey among the new and would-be forest owners. Three
hundred people were interviewed and their answers on their activities and expectations were recorded.
The study was later used for developing a private forestry oriented policy action (EFDP, 1996a).
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Table 1: Stakeholders in the Estonian National Forest Policy Formulation Process.
Stakeholder
Group Motivation
Policy actions
(other than participation)
available to the
stakeholder
Private forest
owners and their
organizations
• To gain direct support
(subsidies, tax breaks, etc.) from
the Government;
• To reduce the Government’s
regulatory power in private
forestry.
• Voice dissatisfaction;
• Poor forestry
performance.
Private forest
industries and
their
organizations
• To tighten control over the raw
material base;
• To achieve direct subsidization
of the industry from the
Government.
• Voice dissatisfaction;
• Financially backing of
Government lobby.
Environmental
non-governmental
organizations
• To enhance the forest
management performance in the
country;
• To strengthen the group’s role in
public policy making.
• Voice dissatisfaction
locally;
• Voice dissatisfaction
abroad.
Local
municipalities
• To increase regional benefits
(rural employment, tax
revenues).
• Influence on the
electorate;
• Influence on Cabinet
decisions.
Research and
educational
institutes
• To increase Government funding
for research and training;
• To clarify the sector
development and adjust
accordingly.
• Publication of
research outcomes;
• Voice dissatisfaction.
Public forestry
administration
• To fulfill the office’s
responsibilities;
• To maintain their status in
Government hierarchy.
• Adopt closed-door
policy-making.
Ministry of
finance
• To serve the Government
Treasury’s needs.
• Increase Treasury’s
allocation via
influence on
Cabinet’s decisions.
Other government
ministries
• To fulfill (and expand) their
functions.
• Use agency’s position
in Government
hierarchy.
Source: EFDP, 1997b.
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The steering committee met three times. The strong representation of different
government agencies — representatives from four ministries plus the Director of the
State Forestry Department — effectively outweighed the other stakeholders’ dispersed
interests. The coordinators attempted to alleviate growing dissatisfaction with the
process by approaching the interest groups individually for consultations. These ‘behind
the curtains’ negotiations were frequently fruitful, as compromises were made and the
voice of private interest groups in the policy preparation increased. Good examples of
this were a much stronger involvement of regional municipalities in the local level
forestry decisions, and a thorough revision of environmental conservation matters in the
policy that the steering group eventually agreed upon. What failed was an attempt to
determine the exact judicial status of the Government’s forest management
organization. The forest industries’ effort to make the management of public forests
follow the same exact procedures established for the private enterprises was met with
strong resistance from the public administration’s side. Even though a radical decision
to split the State’s forestry functions between two organizations — the forest manager
and the forest supervisor — was made, the exact legal framework, in which each would
operate was left undefined. At the end of the day, the industry’s fear of facing a
Government monopoly in local wood procurement was not resolved. Conflicts on a
personal level also overruled attempts to settle differences concerning the role of
government ministries on the assistance to private forestry. A complete exclusion of the
Ministry of Agriculture from the country’s forestry matters resulted, causing great
concern among the latter agency’s employees.
Despite the differences in opinions within the steering committee, the group, pressured
by its Chair, the Minister for the Environment V. Reiljan, accepted a final wording for
the policy recommendations. The Minister thereafter immediately submitted the
proposal to the Government, which quickly agreed on the contents of the document and
further submitted it to the Parliament for political approval. The endorsement in the
Parliament came at the first reading; the document received unanimous support both
from the members of the ruling coalition as well as the opposition. By June 1997, a little
more than one and a half years after the Program had been launched, Estonia had a new
National Forest Policy (for contents see Table 2).
18
Table 2: Principal Goals of the Estonian National Forest Policy approved by the
Estonian Parliament in 1997.
Policy Goal Means of Achievement Current Stage ofImplementation
Biological diversity
conservation
• Establishment of forestry
information systems.
• Creation of a comprehensive
nature conservation network.
• Not started
• Underway
Increased forest
productivity
• Improvement of forest
management and management
planning practices.
• Not started
(started only in
the state forests)
Qualified labor suitable
for conducting forestry
operations
• Introduction of demand-based
forestry research and higher
education.
• Not started
Increased public
awareness
• Public awareness raising
programs.
• Not started
Efficient use of private
forests
• Development of extension
service for private forest owners.
• Terminated
Efficient Use of Public
Forests
• Reorganization of the public
forestry administration.
• Underway
Source: EFDP 1997b.
4.3 The Policy Implementation
The most significant, and perhaps the only immediate positive contribution that the
Program made to the country’s forest sector development was the restructuring of the
public forestry administration. A separate State Forest Management Organization was
established with the aim of improving efficiency in State forestry. The economic
analyses conducted during the policy formulation process indicated that labor
productivity in Estonian public forest management was low, achieving just 15 percent
of the Scandinavian level (EFDP, 1996b). Moreover, projections indicated that the State
Forestry Department was expected to run into deficit by 1998 (Diagram 3). The black
scenario that the economists had predicted for the country’s public forestry required
prompt reaction.
The initiative for this did not, however, come from the top administration but from a
group of the Forestry Department’s regional and district managers, who were deeply
disappointed with the development of the organization by that time. Foreseeable
financial difficulties, which the above-mentioned analysis had revealed, meant that
nobody was indifferent on the matter. The reaction that came from the lowest level of
the forestry organization — the forest districts — was quite the opposite of the ideas
that the regional managers had started pursuing. Expectedly, the higher levels of the
organizational hierarchy saw a tighter financial and management control as the primary
means for improving the situation. Many of the district managers, on the other hand,
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already enjoying a great degree of freedom, became very much in favor of loosening the
economic ties between the individual districts and the central (budget) authority even
further. A revolution inside the Department was imminent. As it turned out, the
revolting forest district managers did not have sufficient cohesion or power to seriously
affect the process. Since the Department’s top administration did not have a solution to
offer themselves, the regional managers’ initiative to establish a separate public forest
management organization became the only viable policy option.
Diagram 3: Predicted Development of the Estonian State Forestry Department in 1996
(Source: EFDP, 1996b).
Using his strong personal leadership skills, the Minister for the Environment, Mr.
Reiljan, ensured that the forest policy steering group agreed to split the public forestry
functions between two organizations. One was supposed to take over the management
of public forests, the other to fulfill the regulatory functions of the State. At that time,
the question was more on how to ensure that this reorganization would actually appear
in the relevant legislation, and once it was there, to guarantee that the new organizations
were capable of executing their responsibilities. Despite the absence of a legal
framework a so-called ‘project’ state forest management organization was established
under the direct guidance of Mr. Reiljan. The former regional manager and the National
Coordinator of the Forestry Development Program, Mr. A. Onemar, was chosen to
become the Project Manager. The core project team was selected via public recruitment.
Hopeful for a change, some of the most influential and respected regional and district
managers applied and were chosen for the job.
The project organization, still under supervision of the State Forestry Department, was
expected to introduce a major shift in traditional forest management in Estonia. It was
determined to optimize the structure of the existing management organization (the forest
districts), bring law and order to the organization and, ultimately, to avoid the
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bankruptcy of State forestry. Once the proper laws were in place, the organization was
supposed to be given independence to operate as a government-owned business
organization. Today, the State Forest Management Organization is showing much
improved performance (Diagram 4).
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Diagram 4: Actual Performance and Predicted Future Development of the Estonian
State Forest Management Organization in 2000 (Source: ESFMC, 2000).
The existing State Forestry Department was supposed to fill the other roles of the State
— forest policy revision, supervision of the country’s forests of all ownership
categories, and provision of advisory services for the private forest owners. Afraid of
losing its dominance in the forestry arena, the State Forestry Department asserted its
control over forest policy implementation activities. Due to the lack of interest and poor
leadership, the Department had no more influential role than any other stakeholder did
during the policy formulation. Now, the Department took the initiative and formed an
expert committee for the revision of the Forestry Act. Since the committee only
consisted of public sector employees, its activities involved very little stakeholder
participation. In addition, the proposed Act hardly made any reference to the National
Forest Policy. Vocal dissatisfaction expressed by private interests was ignored (Sootla et
al., 1998).
This development was perhaps the first warning sign, indicating that the forest policy
implementation was not going to be easy. The new Forestry Act (1998) was passed in
December 1998. What is not yet accounted for is the cost of the acrimonious battle
between the stakeholders and the Government’s forestry administration prior to the
approval, the clipped contents of the Act, and the actual impact of the endorsed
principles.
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4.4 Lessons from the Second Wave of Change
In order to evaluate the impact of the forest policy formulation and implementation
several stakeholder group representatives were interviewed during the summer of 2000.
Perhaps due to the survey method — e-mail inquiry, bad timing, and the vacation
season — very few responses were received. Those that were received gave, the
impression that dissatisfaction with the taken course of action in today’s forestry might
have hampered the interviewees’ enthusiasm to respond.8 With no exception, all the
respondents acknowledged the merits of participatory policy formulation and admitted
that their attendance or expression of views were never restricted during the process.
However, it was emphasized that democracy and respect for stakeholders’ opinions
ended once policy formulation reached the steering committee level. According to the
interview response from Mr. R. Ahas, the Head of the Forestry Committee of the largest
local environmental NGO, “unfortunately, the policy formulation was in many cases
dominated by the minister’s [the Minister for the Environment] and other politicians’
will. In other words, the political parties in power decided on the final design of the
document. In that way the meaning of many original proposals was changed.”
All respondents stressed that reorganization of the forestry administration had made a
significant positive impact on State forest management in the country. On the other
hand, none of the interviewees were able to name any other successfully implemented
policy measures. As a matter of fact, everyone was disappointed that hardly any action
had been taken other than changes in the State forest management. Private forest owners
complained about the lack of support for their activities and the fact that even the
limited measures listed in the policy document had not been introduced. The
environmental NGOs were dissatisfied with the poor regulatory framework for forest
management. A representative of the only vocational forestry school in the country
criticized the negligible efforts that the Government had made to raise the quality of
forestry education and training. Adding to this, she admitted that as the policy document
was weak in terms of content anyway, it might even be good that not much had
happened in terms of implementation. Most respondents emphasized still non-existent
information systems as the main hurdle to policy implementation.
Personal interviews with the members of the Estonian forestry community indicate that
support to policy implementation from private stakeholders is currently missing. The
fact that the State Forest Management Organization is constantly under lobbyists’
attacks and that politicians are bribed to take measures to get rid of it, supports the
argument. The Ministry of Agriculture, who had never given up the idea of achieving
control of private forestry, has put the issue back on the table. Recently, the local
environmental NGOs placed Estonian forestry among the least attuned to preserve
biological diversity in the world. Worst of all, the open dialogue that participatory
policy making was supposed to create, and the optimism the stakeholders initially
showed towards such a process, has been squandered.
The opposite trend can be observed by looking at the only success story of the Forestry
Development Program — the establishment of the State Forest Management
                                               
8
 The body of interviewees consisted of members of the Steering Committee and representatives of the
stakeholders who participated in the National Forest Policy formulation process. All together 20
questionnaires were sent out and 5 responses received.
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Organization. Personal interviews with the staff members prior to the restructuring had
revealed a broad-based discontent with the headquarters of the State Forestry
Department. The organization’s performance has improved and so have the employees’
attitudes. The formation of a project organization and the appointment of Mr. Onemar
as the Head and several other respected individuals from the lower levels of the
organizational hierarchy as a core management team, were clearly the foundations for
success there. Strong leadership, personal commitment and an attempt to achieve an
open development within the project organization allowed the best ideas to surface.
Even if the selected course was not the most favorable from the personal perspective of
many of the employees, confidence about the future and trust in the leadership was
sufficient to overcome potential opposition.
5. Discussion
Mishler and Rose (1998, p. 29) claim that “as institutional performance holds the key to
trust in political institutions, then the process of building trust in institutions can occur
much more rapidly than the generations or centuries, suggested by cultural theories.”
Thompson, et al. (1990, p. 218) manifest that “[e]xperience with institutions counts,”
and argue that political culture, “conceived as ways of life that are continually being
negotiated, tested and probed by individuals,” explains political change.
Lack of trust towards the Soviet-era administrators was common in the pre-
liberalization Estonia. Likely, this turned into the strongest card in the hands of the new
era politicians after the country’s independence was re-established. Initiating a quick
separation of business from the Government was perhaps the action that most
significantly contributed to trust-building in the society. Citizens’ attitudes were further
enhanced by making economic decisions that were acceptable for the majority interest.
Clarification of often messy public functions, a reduction of those functions and
assignment of rights and responsibilities in a way that did not create conflicts inside the
same organization, were the policy actions that guaranteed the actual implementation of
chosen policies.
The entire transition period in Estonian forestry supports one very obvious conclusion
— people will rarely do anything against what they consider socially acceptable.
Reliance on social norms is ultimately what lays the basis for the control over the
formal rules that Douglass C. North has identified as being our only available decision
variables. In order to be able to do so, these norms have to be supported by many and,
even more importantly, by the organized many, who are capable of openly and
forcefully expressing their views. Having the opportunity to compare, match, and in
some cases also neglect, people’s perceptions is the only way to develop an action that
is acceptable for those upon whom it has an impact.
The subsequent steps in the development of the Estonian forest sector throughout the
ten years of transition articulate these views. Placing the described process in between
North’s scaffolds offers us some insight to why and how some policy actions succeed,
while others do not (Figure 4).
The impetus for much of the described development period was given by the political
change that immediately followed the separation of the country from the Soviet Union.
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The society indicated its readiness for the shift via the general elections that produced
public governance capable of and willing to undertake radical steps in the economic and
social restructuring. On the forestry scale the split of old administrative networks took
place.
Figure 4: Development of the Estonian Forest Sector in Scaffolds.
The establishment of private property rights and the fast take-off of private business
ventures idealized the status of a private entrepreneur within society, resulting in a
brain-drain from Government offices. The authorities were unable to fulfill their
responsibilities and the implementation of formal rules was hindered. In contrast, the
private sector — timber industry and environmental NGO’s — was strengthened and
became organized, enabling them to independently enter the political debates.
Stakeholder discontent became the policy action that initiated the next phase in the
forest sector development — public policy formulation. Raised hopes to improve the
dissatisfactory situation ensured active participation by the stakeholders.
The policy formulation process had its definite successes, such as the approval of
National Forest Policy and the reform of public forestry organizations. It also promoted
the empowerment of the stakeholder role within society. However, according to the
interviewed stakeholder representatives, forest policy implementation has brought about
only limited results in other fields. Also, it has pushed the stakeholder groups away
from the public policy-making arena. It can be argued that two actions: (i) the exclusion
of stakeholders from the final policy formulation; and (ii) the choice of policy
implementation pattern that does not involve stakeholder participation, are the primary
causes for these failures. As indicated above, the private groups are already using
methods other than participation in public dialogue for achieving their desired goals.
Further avoidance of stakeholder involvement in the policy-making process is, perhaps,
not going to improve the situation.
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Referring to the handful of key individuals whose names appeared throughout the
described development process, it could be argued that much of the policy success
depends on decision-makers’ individual roles. The establishment of timber auctions and
the failure to restructure the public forestry organization at the beginning of the 1990s,
can both be associated with the top management of the State Forestry Department. The
lack of initiative in improving the Department’s performance inevitably resulted in
more abrupt organizational change in the next phase of the sector’s development.
Minister Reiljan’s strong involvement in the EFDP steering committee’s decision-
making process supports the argument. Having greeted the policy formulation initiative
with much enthusiasm, the stakeholders, not being able to significantly influence the
outcome, have not been supportive of the policy implementation. Misuse of
participation makes the policy formulation process in Estonia a pertinent example of
how the violation of unwritten rules can trigger unwanted policy actions.
Turning away from open discussion has resulted in a lack of continuity in public policy-
making and has certainly not allowed for the establishment of a self-enforcing policy
revision process. On the other hand, Mr. R. Ahas’ suggestion that politicians should not
be involved in modifying experts’ policy proposals questions the former group’s role in
society. Ideally, there should be room for both — for the people from inside the sector,
e.g. the forest owners, environmentalists, etc., and for the external interests, e.g.,
politicians representing the public opinion and other Government agencies. Acceptance
of the rules of the game and the role of players, however, has to be reached prior to
starting the process. Raising the responsibility for the sector’s policy making to a higher
hierarchical level than just a respective Government office should provide the means to
accomplish this task.
The Estonian forest sector development can be claimed to illustrate that in order to
achieve results and introduce changes, the initiative for the change must come from
inside the organization whose operations are to be altered. Also, the “right” leaders for
the change have to be found. As part of the public policy formulation process, the
Estonian State Forestry Department had to give up its position in the Government
hierarchy. The Department’s regional and district managers, who initiated the
restructuring of the public forestry administration in 1996–1997, have gained a strong
hold of the country’s forest sector. The results that the new organization — the State
Forest Management Organization — has achieved depend upon the personal trust that
managers were able to build among employees and the commitment the personnel itself
has made to support the development.
Earle and Cvetkovich (1995, p. 150) warn us that full participation leads to cynicism,
distrust, and withdrawal. Without trying to judge whether this has been the case in
Estonia, it is likely that involvement of stakeholders throughout the ten years of
transition in the country’s forest sector significantly altered its development course.
Participation was a tool used in this process, as it allowed to “negotiate, test and probe,”
contributing to the decision-making. Since the decisions did not always follow what the
negotiations had proposed, the outcomes disappointed the decision-makers on several
occasions. This seems to suggest that what may guarantee policy success or lead to
policy failure is not participation per se, but the manner in which it is used.
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